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Abstract
Does trade improve the income levels of the poor and less developed nations? Focusing on
the least developed countries (LDCs) designated by the United Nations, we construct a new
measure of trade cost, based on the Baltic Dry Index (BDI), as an instrument for trade. The
BDI reflects the cost of utilizing dry bulk carriers, which are specially designed vessels for
transporting primary goods internationally, where these goods dominate the output and export
sectors of the LDCs. We find that a one percent expansion in trade raises GDP per capita by
approximately 0.5 percent on average. This estimate is much larger than previously found in
the literature and its quantitative significance emphasizes the importance of trade towards the
economic development of low income countries.
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As early as Sir Dennis Robertson (1940), international trade has been characterized as an “engine
of growth” by which the goal of economic development and improving living standards can be
achieved. From the development perspective, the positive association between trade and income
levels is an encouraging fact. But belying it is an uneasy empirical regularity that the core of
global trade is dominated by the exclusive trade between developed, wealthy countries (Baldwin
and Martin, 1999; Krugman, 2009).1 The weak participation levels in international trade by low
income countries therefore raises an important question. If the positive association between trade
and income is causal, does the benefit of trade in lifting living standards extend to them as well?
In this context, the answer is not always clear cut. As early as Nurkse (1959), it has been argued
that low income countries may not benefit as much from the opening of trade.2 This is because
their exports are mainly primary goods, and the world market for their output would only expand
slowly given that the demand for primary goods is generally income inelastic.
In this paper, we examine the link between trade and income improvements for the 48 least
developed countries (LDCs) designated by the United Nations. A main issue, often emphasized in
the literature, is that trade is endogenous in the determination of income levels.3 To address this,
we construct a new measure of trade cost as an external source of variation in trade, which in turn
is used to construct the within-country estimate of the causal effect that trade has on income of
the LDCs. The LDCs are home to more than 880 million people, or about 12 percent of the world’s
population. However, they account for less than 2 percent of global output, 1 percent of global
trade in goods and 2 percent of global trade in primary goods.4 The export sectors of the LDCs are
heavily dominated by the export of primary goods, many of which are transported internationally
by a class of specially designed vessels known as dry bulk carriers, or bulk carriers in short. This
paper exploits the cost of utilizing bulk carriers as summarized by the Baltic Dry Index (BDI) to
construct a new measure of trade cost for the LDCs. Our measure of trade cost, which is used as
1For instance, in 2010, the total export volume of OECD countries accounts for about 64 percent of world total
exports and their total import volume accounts for about 66 percent of world total imports.
2As compared to higher income countries with manufacturing-based economies. See, also, Kaldor (1964).
3Firstly, decisions on whether to trade, and how much to trade, are not randomly assigned. Secondly, the regression
analysis may be confounded by the reverse causal effect going from income to trade.
4These are calculated based on 2010 data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNC-
TAD).
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an instrument for trade, is the interaction between the log of the BDI and the country’s primary
products share of its total trade. This primary products share captures the relative intensity of
bulk shipping utilization across the LDCs. A larger share amplifies the response of trade to the
BDI, which helps to generate country-specific effects of the BDI on trade across time.
Our empirical analysis shows that a reduction in the BDI has a positive effect on the income of
the LDCs through the trade channel. Our main instrumental variable estimates reveal that a one
percent expansion in trade increases GDP per capita by 0.484 to 0.534 percent on average. This
elasticity of income per capita with respect to trade is especially significant in light of previous
findings in the literature. For instance, Feyrer (2009a) finds the elasticity to be in the region of
0.157 to 0.253 when both developed and developing countries are taken into consideration. Since
our focus is restricted to the LDCs, our results suggest that the standard of living in the LDCs
may be improved from the opening of trade. Furthermore, inferring from the smaller estimates in
Feyrer (2009a), our findings also suggest that a low income country could benefit much more in
income improvements from the deepening of trade than its wealthier counterparts.
Even though the literature on trade and income has a rich history, it is more recently that
the issue of identification is given specific attention.5 Our paper fits into this line of research on
identifying the causality of trade on income by using the variation in trade cost as an estimation
strategy. The groundbreaking paper is due to Frankel and Romer (1999), who use geographic
distance between countries in the gravity equation as a reflection of trade cost for identifying the
exogenous variation in bilateral trade volumes. However, in his seminal work, Feyrer (2009a, 2009b)
cautions that distance (or proximity) may be capturing other factors unrelated to trade cost.6 For
instance, he argues that distance may be correlated with geography-based determinants of income
such as tastes, cultural characteristics, colonial institutions and disease environments, which raises
5For instance, Dollar (1992) and Sachs and Warner (1995) find that trade openness and income are positively
related, but they do not focus on addressing the issue that trade openness is potentially endogenous. Although
Edwards (1998) uses instrumental variables based on historical information such as historical TFP growth, measures
of openness, and trade to GDP ratio, he cautions that the use of instrumental variables to address the endogeneity
problem has not been conclusive hitherto, and that the causal relationship of trade and income is still a somewhat
open issue in the empirical literature.
6Other related studies, focusing on historical trade flows, include Jacks and Pendakur (2010) and Jacks, Meissner
and Novy (2011). Jacks and Pendakur (2010) exploit the revolution of maritime transport to explain the historical
variation in international trade from 1870 to 1913 but find no evidence that the maritime transport revolution was
the primary driver of the late-nineteenth-century global trade boom. Jacks et al. (2011) look at the importance of
bilateral trade costs in determining international trade flows over different periods in history.
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question about the validity of the exclusion restriction in Frankel and Romer (1999).7 While the
effects of these geography-based determinants may be purged by including country fixed effects, the
cross-sectional regression design of Frankel and Romer (1999) makes it virtually infeasible to do so.8
In this regard, although our paper is related to Frankel and Romer (1999) in its focus on trade and
income, it differs by constructing an instrument that contains not only cross-country variation, but
also time variation so that country fixed effects can be used to control for all unobserved permanent
income differences.
In the spirit of constructing a time-varying instrument for trade to study its effect on income,
our paper is related to two important papers of Feyrer (2009a,b), which introduce a key insight that
distance is not a static concept. In Feyrer (2009a), a natural experiment, stemming from the Arab-
Israeli conflict that saw the closing and re-opening of the Suez canal during 1967–1975, provides two
major shocks to shipping distance that is crucial for identifying the exogenous variation in trade. In
Feyrer (2009b), the identification strategy relies on improvements in air transportation technology
that may increase the relative importance of air versus sea freight over time. Because countries
utilize air and sea routes for trade in various ways, the rapid decline in the cost of air relative to sea
freight would benefit countries differently,9 generating country-specific effects of air transportation
innovation that form the basis of Feyrer’s (2009b) approach. While our paper shares a common
goal as Feyrer (2009a,b) in trying to pin down the exogenous variation in trade, the estimation
strategies of Feyrer (2009a,b) are not easily adaptable to our study focusing on the LDCs for the
following reasons.
Firstly, Feyrer (2009a,b) constructs an instrument of trade using predicted values of bilateral
trade from an estimated gravity equation. This procedure requires bilateral trade data, which is
7Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) argue that the instrument of Frankel and Romer (1999) may not be valid. For
instance, they show that by including additional summary indicators of geography, such as distance from the equator,
the percentage of a country’s land area that lies in the tropics, and a set of regional dummies, the statistical and
quantitative significance of trade found in Franker and Romer (1999) may be driven out completely.
8This critique is also relevant to Alcala´ and Ciccone (2004), Irwin and Tervio¨ (2002) and Noguer and Siscart
(2005), as they examine the relationship of trade and income using the Frankel and Romer approach. Based on an
extension of Frankel and Romer (1999), Alcala´ and Ciccone (2004) employ all available bilateral trade data, including
bilateral trade pairs with zero trade, and show that doing so would improve the explanatory power of the first stage
regression and generate more robust second stage estimates of the effect of trade on income. Irwin and Tervio¨ (2002)
evaluate the findings of Frankel and Romer using data from the pre-World War I, interwar and post-war periods, and
conclude that the main result of Frankel and Romer holds throughout the whole of 20th century. Noguer and Siscart
(2005) use a richer data set with fewer missing observations to conduct the Frankel and Romer analysis and arrive
at a similar conclusion.
9Feyrer (2009b, p.3) notes that the cost of moving goods by air fell by a factor of ten between 1955 and 2004.
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highly incomplete for the LDCs. For example, to use the approach of Feyrer (2009a) for our study,
bilateral trade data during 1975 and earlier is required for exploiting the “Suez experiment”, but
such information is completely missing during this period for a significant number of LDCs.10 The
challenge of estimating the trade-income relationship for all 48 LDCs is not mitigated by appealing
to the approach of Feyrer (2009b) as the instrument for trade is constructed in a manner that
necessitates bilateral trade information, and such information for the LDCs may be substantially
incomplete or even completely missing throughout the entire sample period, not just during the
1960s and 1970s.11
Secondly, the estimation strategies of Feyrer (2009a,b) may not be as tightly linked to the LDCs
as the BDI is through its influence on primary trade. With respect to Feyrer (2009a), one feature
in his natural experiment approach is that following the closing and re-opening of the Suez canal,
a sharp response in the average shipping distance is only observed for a small set of countries
surrounding the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea.12 Hence, except for the few LDCs that are located
there, the average shipping distance of the remaining LDCs may only respond weakly to the Suez
“shocks”.13 With respect to Feyrer (2009b), the shift toward the use of air transportation has not
been that dramatic for the LDCs. For example, the volume of air freight (million ton-kilometer)
of the U.S. is 50 times larger than that of all LDCs combined in 2010,14 compared to only about
23 times larger with respect to the same LDCs in 1980.15 This perhaps reflects the fact that air
10For instance, consider the Direction of Trade (DoT) data set of the IMF used by Rose (2004), and in turn by
Feyrer (2009a,b). During 1975 and earlier, bilateral trade data is completely missing for countries such as Afghanistan,
Cambodia, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Laos, Samoa, Senegal, Sa˜o Tome´ and Pr´ıncipe, Solomon
Islands, Vanuatu, Tuvalu, Bhutan and Kiribati. Even for LDCs where bilateral trade data is available during this
period, it is usually highly incomplete as information on bilateral trade with a large number of trade partners could
be missing.
11In the 1990s, bilateral trade data is completely missing for Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti,
Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Myanmar, Senegal, Somalia, Sudan, Timor-Leste and Tuvalu. In fact, bilateral trade
information on Afghanistan, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Timor-Leste and Tuvalu is completely missing in the
Rose (2004) sample.
12For example, Feyrer (2009a) shows that the top five countries in terms of trade weighted increase in sea distance
(in percentages) following the closure of the Suez canal are Pakistan (31.4%), India (30.6%), Kenya (23.6%), Sri
Lanka (20.4%) and Malaysia (13.7%). These countries are either located next to the Arabian Sea (i.e. India and
Pakistan) or the Indian Ocean (i.e. Kenya, Malaysia and Sri Lanka).
13Besides Mozambique and Madagascar, for the remaining LDCs that are included in his sample, Feyrer (2009a)
shows that the trade weighted increase in sea distance following the closure of the Suez canal is less than 1.4%,
compared to the 31.4% and 30.6% increase for Pakistan and India.
14Section 1.1 of Feyrer (2009b) discusses the growing importance of air freight in the U.S.. Before the onset of the
global financial crisis in 2007, the use of air freight (million ton-kilometer) by the U.S. reaches 81 times the level of
utilization by all LDCs combined.
15These figures are computed using the World Development Indicators. The number of LDCs may change over
time. For instance, Dollar (1992) focuses on a sample of 95 LDCs during 1976 to 1985.
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transportation is used mainly for moving high value to weight items such as consumer electronics,
pharmaceuticals, jewelry and precious metals, but not primary products that dominate the trade
of the LDCs.16
Improving the standard of living in low income countries is recognized as one of the most
challenging problems confronting academic and policy makers alike. Our paper contributes to
this discussion by affirming that international trade is an important direction based on which the
economic development of low income countries can be pursued. Therefore, it is related to the
literature that looks at whether there is a positive relationship between trade or trade openness on
the one hand, and the economic development of less developed countries on the other (e.g. Harrison,
1996; Dollar and Kraay, 2004; Estevadeordal and Taylor, 2008),17 although in this literature, the
focus on estimation strategies to pin down the economic impact of trade or trade openness with
respect to these countries is somewhat limited.18 Since our paper exploits the variation in trade cost
in the form of the BDI to identify the effect of trade on income, it is also related to the seminal paper
of Donaldson (2010), who documents a strong positive link between economic development and the
transition from autarky to trade among regions in colonial India, where this transition is facilitated
by the construction of railroads that reduces inter-regional trade cost during that time.19 From
a broader perspective, our paper is also related to the extensive literature that studies the causal
factors of economic development of low income countries, such as the effect of institutions (Acemoglu
16See, also, Table 1 of Feyrer (2009b) for a list of the top 20 Harmonized System (HS) trade categories imported
to the US by air. Absent from this list are primary products.
17Using a variety of openness measures, Harrison (1996) studies the effect of openness on growth among developing
countries and finds that greater openness is associated with higher economic growth. Dollar and Kraay (2004) show
that economic growth can be stimulated by positive changes in trade and conclude that greater involvement in trade
is associated with faster growth in developing countries. Using a difference-in-difference approach, Estevadeordal
and Taylor (2008) offer some evidence that tariff reductions are correlated with growth acceleration amid growing
skepticism that trade is a positive influence on economic performance (e.g. Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2000). These
papers do not attempt to construct an instrument for the main causal variable, i.e. the level of trade or some
measure of trade openness.
18With respect to developing countries, Romalis (2007) proposes a novel strategy, using the U.S. “most-favored
nation” (MFN) tariffs, to identify the exogenous variation in trade openness by looking at how trade activities of
these countries respond to reductions in the U.S. MFN tariffs. His approach is based on the assumption that the
relaxation of trade barriers by the U.S., while encourages an expansion in trade with partner countries that are less
developed, is not influenced in turn by the behavior and actions of these developing countries. However, unlike our
BDI-based instrument, the instrument that Romalis (2007) proposes only varies across time but not across countries,
since the MFN tariffs are applied in the same way by the U.S. to each partner recipient.
19As Donaldson (2010) describes, before the advent of railroads, bullocks that travel no more than 30 kilometers a
day were the main source of transport of India’s commodity trade. In contrast, rails during that time could travel
20 times faster and at much lower per unit distance freight rates. Therefore, the construction of railroads in colonial
India has led to a dramatic reduction in trade cost, encouraging inter-regional trade that fosters regional economic
development.
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and Johnson, 2005), foreign aid (Werker, Ahmed and Cohen, 2009; Bru¨ckner, forthcoming), foreign
direct investment (Borensztein, De Gregorio and Lee, 1998; Nair-Reichert and Weinhold, 2001),
remittance flows (Gupta, Pattillo and Wagh, 2009) and financial development (Hassan, Sanchez
and Yu, 2011).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the construction of a
measure of trade cost, based on the BDI, as an instrument for the trade of the LDCs. The data and
methodology are presented in Section 3. Section 4 presents the baseline results of our regression
and Section 5 discusses some additional robustness checks. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Baltic Dry Index and the Trade of the LDCs
The Baltic Exchange has a long history going back to 1744 when it was first established through
casual conversations between merchants and ships’ captains at the Virginia and Baltick Coffee
House in London’s Threadneedle Street. In 1985, the Baltic Exchange launched the Baltic Dry
Index (BDI), plotted in Figure 1, as a general indicator of shipment rates for dry bulk cargoes,
consisting mainly of raw commodities such as grain, coal, iron ore, copper and other primary
materials. Since its establishment, the BDI has become one of the foremost indicators on the cost
of shipping and an important barometer on the volume of worldwide trade and manufacturing
activity.
The BDI, reflecting the cost of bulk shipping, is especially relevant for the trade of the LDCs.
The LDCs consist of 48 countries located across Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean.
Their exports are mainly made up of primary goods, many of which rely on bulk carriers for
international transportation. Table A in the appendix presents the list of 48 LDCs along with their
main exported products. For the LDCs which some are landlocked, their main exports consist of
cocoa, coffee, tea, cotton, timber and primary metals. As these goods are freight primarily by bulk
carriers, the BDI reflects an important component in the cost of trade so that changes in the BDI
may have an opposite influence on the trade of the LDCs.20
20The cost of exports may be borne by the exporters. Although under the definition of Freight on Board or Free
on Board (FOB), the exporter is responsible for delivering, loading and securing the cargo at the ship and the buyer
is responsible for the cost of shipping, this definition has become somewhat blurred as shipping cost may be shared
between both parties, or even by the exporter. Under the definitions of Cost and Freight (CF) and Cost, Insurance
and Freight (CIF), the exporter pays all expenses incurred in transporting the cargo from its place of origin to the
port of destination.
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To exploit country- and time-specific effects of the BDI, we construct a variable of trade cost
based on the BDI as
BDICi,t = θi,t−1 log(BDIt), (1)
where θi,t−1 is the country i’s proportion of total trade at period t − 1 that consists of primary
commodities trade including trade in iron and steel but excluding fuels. The primary products
share captures the relative intensity of utilizing bulk shipping, and the interaction specification
in (1) allows the impact of BDI to be amplified for countries where primary goods trade is more
important. To obtain data on primary goods trade, we collect information from United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) based on the SITC 0 + 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 68
classification of primary commodities. We combine this trade data with the data based on the
SITC 67 classification that contains information about trade in iron and steel. This combination
covers a wide-range of primary commodities but excludes crude oil, since crude oil requires “wet”
carriers such as tankers but not bulk carriers for transportation. While its predetermined nature
motivates the use of period t− 1 primary trade share as the interaction term in (1), our estimation
results are not sensitive to using contemporaneous primary trade share instead.21 Because BDICi,t
is a measure of trade cost faced by country i that draws on the BDI, we refer this simply as “BDI
cost” for future reference.
Besides being small participants in global trade, accounting for less than 1 percent of world
trade in goods and less than 2 percent of global trade in primary goods, the economies of the
LDCs are also very small on the global scale, accounting for less than 2 percent of worldwide GDP.
Consequently, the LDCs are insignificant when it comes to driving the BDI dynamics. By contrast,
the BDI is an important factor that influences the variation in the trade of the LDCs. Figure 2
compares the annual growth rate of the BDI with the growth in trade volume for some LDCs. It
shows that growth in the BDI is at times accompanied by a slowdown or even contraction in trade.
For several countries, a sharp negative co-movement between the BDI and trade is also documented.
Take Central African Republic and Afghanistan, two landlocked countries, as examples. When the
BDI increased by 131 percent from 2002 to 2003, trade in the two countries fell by 10 and 14 percent
respectively. For some coastal countries, the contraction in trade is even more severe. For instance,
21This is demonstrated as a robustness check in Section 5.
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trade fell by 17 percent for Myanmar, 23 percent for Liberia and 27 percent for Eritrea during the
same period.
Some commentaries have pointed out that the salient features of the BDI are driven by the
growing demand of commodities by large emerging economies. A leading example is China, which
many believed is the main driving force behind recent movements in the BDI.22 For instance, in
2002, China replaced Japan as the top iron ore importer in the world. By 2003, China had more
than doubled its iron ore imports compared to the levels in 2000.23 This surge in iron ore demand
is important because iron ore is by proportion the most important commodity transported by bulk
carriers.24 Besides iron ore, China had transformed itself from being coal exporter to an importer,
thus further driving up the demand for bulk carriers and in turn influencing the BDI trends. To
see the importance of China as a driving force, Figure 3 compares the growth rate of the BDI with
China’s growth in trade volume and shows that the two series track each other closely.25 This tight
positive co-movement is unlike what we have seen for the sample of LDCs documented in Figure 2
where the two series move in the opposite direction at various times.
The positive co-movement is also not peculiar to China alone. For example, Figure 4 focuses on
emerging countries such as Brazil, Russia, India, as well as Australia, which is a key exporter of raw
materials. Just as we saw for China, a positive co-movement between the BDI and trade (in growth)
is clearly manifested with respect to Brazil, Russia, India and Australia.26 Because the BDI is a
measure of trade cost, this positive co-movement could be symptomatic of the endogenous response
of the BDI to the levels of trade of these countries as they, together with China, are dominant
in the trade of primary goods in the world. In contrast, the negative co-movement observed with
respect to the sample of LDCs in Figure 2 indicates that the reverse causal effect on the BDI from
22Jim Buckley, the CEO of the Baltic Exchange, remarked that “To put it in extremely simplistic terms, China
is importing huge amounts of raw materials and exporting manufactured goods, and that’s drawing ships into the
Pacific.” See http://www.stockengineering.com/pictures/090104%20-%20BDI.pdf.
23According to the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, China imported 70 million tons of iron in 2000, rising to 148.13
million tons in 2003. This demand for iron ore is driven in turn by the demand for steel, which is used for the
construction sector as well as the production of automobiles. China is both the world’s largest steel consumer and
producer, producing nearly 50 percent of the global steel output according to the World Steel Association.
24According to Borznois (2006), the main commodities that utilize bulk carriers for transportation are iron ore,
coal and grain. Iron ore and coal are the two most important bulk commodities, comprising 27% and 26% of total
dry bulk trade respectively, followed by grain at 14%. However, iron ore and coal are not the main exports of the
LDCs (see Table A in the appendix).
25It is interesting to note that China’s share of world primary trade in 2010 is 17.69%, or around 10 times the share
of world primary trade of all LDCs combined.
26This tight positive relationship can also be observed with respect to the world’s 15 leading countries, less BRIC
and Australia, in terms of the size of primary goods trade. Details are available upon request.
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the trade is weak or negligible.
3 Data and Methodology
Our data spans from 1995 to 2010. The BDI data is drawn from the London-based Baltic Exchange
office. Income, which is measured by real GDP per capita, as well as nominal trade data are
obtained from the UNCTAD website.27 Real GDP is measured by U.S. Dollars at constant prices
and exchange rates using 2005 as the base year. The trade data is deflated by the U.S. CPI for all
urban consumers, also using 2005 as the base year.28 Table 1 presents the summary statistics of
the main variables of interest.
Our main estimating equation relates log(yi,t), the log of income per capita for country i at year
t, as
log(yi,t) = cy + β log(tradei,t) + δ
′zi,t + µi + µt + vi,t, (2)
where log(tradei,t), the log of trade, is the main causal variable of interest, cy is a constant term, and
zi,t is a vector that represents country-specific characteristics such as a landlocked country dummy
or an island country dummy and other control variables that we use in our robustness checks.29 We
let µi be a generic representation of country fixed effects that capture all time invariant country-
specific characteristics and permanent differences, and µt be a generic representation for time-
varying macroeconomic shocks that affect the LDCs identically. Finally, vi,t is the idiosyncratic
error term clustered at the country level.
The extent of how trade affects income is summarized by β, which is the elasticity of income
per capita with respect to trade. This cannot be consistently estimated by OLS regression as trade
is likely to be endogenous in the income equation, even in spite of controlling for country-specific
characteristics and for country and year fixed effects. Firstly, other determinants of income that are
correlated with trade may be contained in vi,t, a non-exhaustive list of which includes the extent
to which institutions are democratized, the level of foreign aid and foreign direct investment, and
the degree of financial market development that may influence credit constraints.30 Secondly, the
27See http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=1584&lang=1.
28The data comes from ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt.
29Rose (2004) and Helpman et al. (2008) also employ landlocked and island dummies to capture country-specific
differences. But these dummies will be excluded once we control for country fixed effects.
30For example, Bru¨ckner and Ciccone (2011) and Bru¨ckner, Ciccone and Tesei (2012) look at the relationship
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unobserved potential income of a country may be correlated with trade, hence the OLS regression
of (2) is susceptible to self-selection bias or reverse-causality problems.31
This paper uses the BDI to obtain the exogenous variation in the trade of the LDCs. The
estimating equation that relates the log of trade to the BDI cost variable is given by






′zi,t + µi + µt + wi,t, (3)
where cT is a constant term and wi,t is the idiosyncratic error term clustered at the country level.
The kth lag of BDI cost is defined as BDICi,t−k = θi,t−k−1 log(BDIt−k).
32 The inclusion of lagged
effects captures how quickly the effect of BDI cost on the log of trade decays.33 Equation (2) is
estimated using two-stage least squares in conjunction with (3) as the first-stage regression. We
also estimate the effect of BDI cost on income by looking at the reduced form equation:






′zi,t + µi + µt + ri,t. (4)
Equation (4) allows us to directly investigate the within-country effect that BDI cost has on income
that is facilitated by the trade channel.
4 Results
4.1 OLS Estimates
The positive correlation between trade and income is a well documented fact, although it is by
no means indicative of a causal relationship. While OLS regression is unidentified, it nonetheless
between income and democracy, and Yu (2010) examines the link between democracy and trade. Foreign aid is one
concern as recipient countries often have to adhere to pre-conditions encompassing issues such as trade openness
that are imposed by the donor (Edwards, 1993; Bru¨ckner, forthcoming). The relationship between FDI and trade is
investigated, among others, by Markusen and Venables (1998), Markusen (2002) and Markusen, Rutherford and Tarr
(2005). Manova (2008) and Lane (2001) look at the response of trade to financial markets and credit constraints.
31A leading example of reverse causality is illustrated by the gravity equation as it includes income as one of the
key determinants of bilateral trade (Helpman, 1987; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003).
32We have also considered defining lagged instruments as BDICi,t−k = θi,t−1 log(BDIt−k) for the kth lag, with the
share of primary exports fixed at θi,t−1 for each lag. This definition yields very similar results as our estimates in
Section 4.
33Although the first two lags of the BDI cost variable are included as instruments for trade, the main conclusion
about the effect of trade on income is robust even when the third to seventh lags of BDI cost are used as additional
instruments in (3). Details are available upon request.
11
provides a useful starting point for investigating the direction of bias in the estimate of how trade
affects the income of the LDCs. Table 2 presents the OLS results with robust standard errors
clustered at the country level (in parentheses) based on four variations of the income equation
specified in (2). The most basic specification is the simple linear regression of income per capita
on trade (both in logs) without additional controls. As reported in Column I, this na¨ıve regression
produces a negative elasticity of income per capita with respect to trade of -0.094. If the premise
that trade is income improving holds, this negative sign suggests at first blush that the OLS estimate
is downward biased. Since our variables are in levels, one could be concerned that the estimate
reflects a spurious association due to possible comovements between the time trends in trade and
GDP per capita. If this is true, a large R2 would be symptomatic. However, this is not observed
given that the adjusted R2 in Column I is nearly zero.
To reduce the degree of endogeneity within the OLS framework, we control for omitted deter-
minants of income that are correlated with trade. This second regression specification includes
geographic specific variables in the form of island and landlocked dummy variables as additional
controls. As Column II reports, including these variables improves the model’s fit as the adjusted
R2 increases to 0.281. More importantly, the elasticity of income with respect to trade is now
positive at 0.112.
Column III reports a third regression specification that subsumes the geographic factors with
country fixed effects that represent time invariant permanent differences across countries. In Col-
umn IV, year fixed effects, which reflect broad macroeconomic factors that affect the LDCs in an
identical manner, are added to the regression on top of country fixed effects. When country fixed
effects are included, Column III shows that the OLS estimate of the trade elasticity of income
increases to 0.309. Strikingly, the model’s fit improves significantly as the adjusted R2 increases to
0.965. Column IV shows that including time fixed effects raises the elasticity further to 0.331 with
a slight improvement in the adjusted R2.
Therefore, as Table 2 shows, the OLS estimates are always increasing when the geographic
variables, country and year fixed effects are included in successive steps. This suggests that the OLS
estimates are downward biased. One possible reason for this downward bias could be the imprecision
in measuring the macroeconomic aggregates for the LDCs. Measurement error in macroeconomic
aggregates, especially those of less developed countries, is a well-known problem in the empirical
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literature (Deaton, 2005). If this measurement error were classical, the OLS estimates would be
biased towards zero and the estimated effect of trade on income would be attenuated. These factors
confound the causal relationship when estimated using OLS regression and necessitates the use of
an instrument for trade in order to obtain consistent estimates of its effect on income.
4.2 Reduced Form Estimates
Table 3 reports the least squares (reduced form) estimates of the within-country effect that the BDI
cost variable has on income. We consider four variations of this causal relationship. Together with
country and year fixed effects, Column I regresses the log of income per capita on contemporaneous
BDI cost (BDICi,t) only. Columns II and III explore the lagged effects of BDI cost on income by
regressing the log of income per capita on the first lag of BDI cost (BDICi,t−1) and on its second lag
(BDICi,t−2) separately. By regressing on the contemporaneous and lagged BDI cost variables one
at a time, these regressions can shed light on whether the overall effect of BDI cost on income is
sensitive to the choice of exploiting either contemporaneous or lagged information about the BDI.
Finally, allowing both contemporaneous and lagged information of BDI cost to affect income levels,





specification, which is presented as (4), looks at the implications of BDI cost (through the trade
channel) on income over time and documents the relative importance of contemporaneous versus
lagged information about the BDI for predicting income levels.




i,t−2, when regressed sep-
arately one at a time, is a statistically significant predictor of income. Specifically, Columns I-III
show that a one standard deviation increase in BDI cost reduces GDP per capita from 7 per-
cent (Column III) to 8.5 percent (Column I). When controlling for all three BDICi,t, BDI
C
i,t−1 and
BDICi,t−2 variables in the income regression, Column IV shows that a one standard deviation in-
crease in each of the three regressors reduces GDP per capita by 8.3 percent. Therefore, comparing
the results across Columns I-IV, the total impact of BDI cost on income is similar regardless of
whether contemporaneous or lagged values of BDI cost are used in isolation as Columns I-III do,
or whether these are combined as regressors as Column IV does. Column IV also shows that the
impact of BDI cost on income is likely to materialize with a lag, as BDICi,t−2 contributes most to
the total impact that includes both contemporaneous and lagged effects of BDI cost on income.
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One striking finding is that the BDI accounts for a vastly significant proportion of the variation
in income. Across Columns I-IV, the adjusted R2 is above 0.95. Since BDI Cost as defined in (1)
is country-specific, this allows us to compute the country-specific BDI effect on income. For each
country, Figure 5 plots the absolute values of the (time) average response of the log of income per
capita following a one percent increase in the BDI in periods t, t− 1 and t− 2.34 Using equations





(γˆ0θi,t−1 + γˆ1θi,t−2 + γˆ2θi,t−3), (5)
where recall that θi,t−1 is period t − 1 primary trade share of country i. The values of γˆ0, γˆ1 and
γˆ2 are −0.020, −0.003 and −0.053. These are estimates of the contemporaneous and lagged effects
of BDI cost on income obtained from Column IV of Table 3.
As Figure 5 shows, the average absolute BDI elasticity of income per capita is heterogeneous
across countries. For most LDCs, this elasticity ranges from 0.02 to 0.04, implying that GDP per
capita declines by 0.2 to 0.4 percent following a 10 percent increase in the BDI. Mauritania, Somalia
and the Solomon Islands are the only countries where the elasticity exceeds 0.04. Hence among
the LDCs, the income levels of these three countries are most sensitive to movements in the BDI.
The effect of the BDI on income is generally felt more strongly by African than non-African LDCs.
Among the 33 African LDCs, 29 of them (or about 88 percent of African LDCs) have an elasticity
that significantly exceeds 0.02. Among the 15 non-African LDCs, this is true only for 10 of them
(or about 67 percent of non-African LDCs.)
4.3 Two-Stage Least Squares Estimates
Table 4 presents the 2SLS estimates of the causal effect of trade on income. Just as in Table 3,





separately as a single instrument for trade. Column IV combines the three variables to instrument
for trade in accordance with (3). The purpose of exploring these different regression specifications is
to investigate whether the 2SLS estimates are robust to exploiting either contemporaneous or lagged
34This impact can also be interpreted as the absolute value of the total (time) average response of the log of income
per capita over three periods, t, t + 1 and t + 2, following a one percent increase in the BDI in period t. This is
because an increase in the BDI in period t would affect income in periods t, t+ 1 and t+ 2 based on (4).
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information about BDI cost, or both, to instrument for trade. By combining both contemporaneous
and lagged information about BDI cost, Column IV also reveals the relative importance between
contemporaneous and lagged information about the BDI as a source of exogenous variation in trade.
Concerning identification, the first stage results suggest that the instruments are powerful.
Across the different specifications, the instruments are significant at the one percent level with
F-statistics well above the rule-of-thumb threshold of 10 suggested by Staiger and Stock (1997).
While we have shown in Figure 2 that trade and the BDI (in growth) are negatively associated for
a sample of LDCs, the first-stage result confirms that the BDI cost variable is a strong, negative





i,t−2, is included into the trade regression (see Columns I-III), or
whether all three of these variables are combined as instruments for trade (see Column IV). For
instance, focusing on Columns I-III where a single BDI cost instrument is used, a one standard
deviation increase in BDI cost reduces trade from 14 percent (Column II) to 16.1 percent (Column





shows that a one standard deviation increase in BDI cost (in periods t, t − 1 and t − 2) leads to
16.6 percent decline in trade, which is close to the estimates in Columns I-III.
Our findings demonstrate the importance of trade for the economic development of low income
countries. Table 4 shows that the 2SLS estimates of the elasticity of income with respect to trade
range from 0.484 (Column III) to 0.534 (Column I). In other words, a one percent expansion in
trade raises GDP per capita of the LDCs by approximately 0.5 percent on average. The 2SLS
estimates are also very tight across the different specifications. For instance, the estimated causal
effect differs only by 0.004 between Columns I and II, demonstrating the robustness of the 2SLS
estimates to the choice of using either contemporaneous or lagged information about the BDI as
an estimation strategy. The 2SLS estimates also affirm that the OLS estimates are downward
biased. For instance, the OLS elasticity estimates of around 0.3 only capture 60 percent of the
income response to trade based on the ballpark 2SLS elasticity estimate of 0.5. This emphasizes
the importance of taking the endogeneity of trade into careful consideration as OLS regression may
severely under-report the economic benefits that the LDCs may gain from the opening of trade.
Given that the BDI cost variable is country-specific, the BDI effect on trade will be heteroge-
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neous across countries.35 For each country, Figure 6 plots the absolute values of the (time) average
response of the log of trade following a one percent increase in the BDI in periods t, t − 1 and
t − 2. This country-specific BDI elasticity of trade is constructed using equations (1) and (3) as





(αˆ0θi,t−1 + αˆ1θi,t−2 + αˆ2θi,t−3), (6)
where the values of αˆ0, αˆ1 and αˆ2 are -0.030, -0.012 and -0.111 respectively, which are the estimates
of the impact of BDI cost on trade obtained from Column IV of Table 4. Figure 6 shows that the
effect of the BDI on trade is more pronounced for African LDCs. Among the 33 African LDCs,
24 of them exhibits an absolute BDI elasticity of trade that is significantly greater than 0.05. For
non-African LDCs, this is true only for 6 of the 15 countries. Therefore, not surprisingly, the impact
of trade on income driven by the BDI will also be more important for African LDCs, which Figure
5 has already shown.36
Our paper is similar to Feyrer (2009a) in that it draws on the variation in shipping cost to
construct a time-varying instrument for trade, where interestingly in both papers, the OLS estimate
of the trade elasticity of income is around 0.3. However, we depart from Feyrer (2009a) in our
estimation strategy and most importantly in our focus on the LDCs. While we find that the
2SLS estimates of the trade elasticity of income are larger than the OLS estimates, the opposite
is observed in Feyrer (2009a). Because our paper focuses on the LDCs while Feyrer (2009a) looks
at both developed and developing countries, two observations can be made. Firstly, since the OLS
estimate is larger than the 2SLS estimate in Feyrer (2009a), this implies that positive selection
effects are present when both developed and developing countries are taken into account. Our
finding that the OLS estimate is downward biased suggests that other confounding effects could be
at work with respect to the LDCs.
Secondly, our 2SLS estimates, being about twice the size of Feyrer’s (2009a) estimates, highlight
once again that low income countries could benefit much from the opening of trade. If trade is
indeed beneficial, this begs the question of why the size of trade of the LDCs is so small relative
to the size (in particular the population) of these countries. One reason could be that the burden
35This in turn implies that the BDI driven effect of trade on income will be heterogeneous as well.
36The country-specific impact of trade on income driven by a one percent increase in the BDI is identical to the
reduced form impact on income following a one percent increase in the BDI. This is already plotted in Figure 5.
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of trade cost is so high for low income countries that it inhibits the process of trade deepening.
For instance, there is a growing literature that looks at whether trade cost affects developed and
developing countries asymmetrically. If trade frictions between wealthy and low income countries
are asymmetric in the sense that the burden of trade cost is higher for low income countries, then
such asymmetric trade frictions could result in large and persistent differences in living standards
between these nations (Waugh, 2010).
To follow up on this theme, we focus on a group of wealthy small-open economies and examine
whether their trade activity might be affected by BDI cost in similar ways as the LDCs. Table B in
the appendix lists a sample of wealthy economies with very small trade volumes that are included
in this analysis. These countries belong to the group of “high income” countries, classified by the
World Bank as countries whose gross national income per capita exceeds 12,276 U.S. Dollars in
2010. Like the LDCs, these high income countries account for a very small proportion of global
trade (0.03 percent), although the primary goods share of their trade may be nontrivial.37 Because
their total trade volume is so small on the global scale, it is also unlikely to generate an endogenous
response in the BDI. Table 5 shows that the effect of BDI cost on trade for these countries is usually
statistically insignificant across the different regression specifications. If the effect is statistically
significant, it is estimated with the wrong (positive) sign. In other words, the negative effect of
BDI cost on trade is absent with respect to these wealthy small-open economies. Given that such
negative effects are observed for the LDCs, this offers some evidence affirming the asymmetric
burden of trade cost between wealthy and low income countries and highlights the possible role of
trade cost in preventing the process of trade deepening among the LDCs.
So far, our analysis has taken both landlocked and non-landlocked LDCs into account. However,
as trade might be affected by a country’s landlocked status, there is no reason to take for granted
that our earlier estimates would be similar for both landlocked and non-landlocked LDCs. In
fact, they should be more pronounced for non-landlocked LDCs given the direct access to sea
transportation these countries have. Table 6 reports the regressions based on the sample of non-
landlocked LDCs only. Compared to the previous estimates, the negative effect of BDI cost on trade
is even stronger here, suggesting that the trade of non-landlocked LDCs is more sharply influenced
37The nontrivial primary goods share of total trade of these wealthy small-open economies implies that an important
part of their trade relies on bulk carriers for international transport. The average primary goods share of total trade
among these countries is 0.19. The maximum share is 0.66.
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by the BDI. For instance, Table 6 shows that a one standard deviation increase in BDI cost has
a total effect of reducing trade from 16.8 percent (Column II) to 18.9 percent (Column IV), and
these estimates are larger than the baseline estimates ranging from 14 to 16.6 percent. The second
stage regression also shows that the effect of trade on income is stronger for non-landlocked LDCs.
As compared to the ballpark baseline estimate of 0.5, the estimated trade elasticity of income in
Table 6 ranges from 0.654 (Column III) to 0.718 (Column II), which suggests that the economic
benefits from the opening of trade are even more pronounced for non-landlocked LDCs.
5 Robustness Checks
This section considers several robustness checks against our baseline 2SLS results. The first ro-
bustness check is related to the use of lagged primary products share of total trade, i.e. θi,t−1, in
the construction of the baseline BDI cost given by BDICi,t in (1). Instead of using the lagged share,
we consider using the contemporaneous primary trade share to construct the BDI cost variable as
BDI
C
i,t = θi,t log(BDIt). (7)
Table 7 presents new estimates using (7) and its lags as instruments for trade. Compared to the
baseline results in Table 4 where the estimated trade elasticity of income per capita ranges from
0.484 to 0.534, Table 7 shows that the estimated elasticity using these new instruments ranges from
0.495 to 0.538. The first stage results are also very similar across Tables 4 and 7. Whereas Table
4 shows that a one standard deviation increase in the baseline BDI cost measure reduces trade
from 14 to 16.6 percent, Table 7 shows that a one standard deviation increase in the new BDI cost
measure reduces trade from 13.6 percent (Column III) to 18.4 percent (Column I). Such similarities
suggest that our analysis is robust to using either the contemporaneous or lagged primary trade
share in the construction of country-specific BDI cost variable as an instrument for trade.
The second robustness check continues by exploring the implication of using the interaction of




i,t = θi,t−k log(BDIt). (8)
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The use of more distant lags in the above construction is related to the concern that country-specific
productivity shocks could be persistent, possibly lasting for a few years. Because productivity
shocks are unobserved determinants of income and because they could be persistent, the error term
in the income equation might be correlated with the first lag of trade share that is used to construct
the country-specific BDI cost in (1).38 That being said, if our “baseline instrument” (i.e. BDICi,t)
were questionable, our baseline result would be fragile to using different lags of the primary trade
share when constructing the instrument for trade, but this is not the case. For instance, when
trade is instrumented with B˜DI
C,k
i,t , for k = 2 (Column I) to k = 5 (Column IV), Table 8 shows
that the trade elasticity of income per capita ranges from 0.465 (Column III) to 0.583 (Column
IV). The average elasticity estimate across all columns is 0.51, which is in line with the ballpark
2SLS estimate of 0.5.
The third robustness check involves omitting the financial crisis years from 2008 to 2010. The
BDI was extremely volatile during these years, where it peaked in the second quarter of 2008 only
to crash by about 95 percent from its peak by the third quarter of 2009 (refer to Figure 1). Since
the BDI was especially volatile during this period, it is useful to see to what extent the baseline
results in Table 4 are driven by this volatility. Table 9 presents the results excluding the years
from 2008 to 2010. Interestingly, the negative effect of the BDI on trade in the first stage is even
larger than the baseline estimates, where in the former case, a one standard deviation increase
in BDI cost reduces trade from 16.6 percent (Column II) to 23.4 percent (Column IV). Despite
this heightened impact of BDI cost on trade in the first stage regression, it has little bearing on
our elasticity estimates in the second stage regression. The second stage estimates, which range
from 0.490 to 0.541, are very similar to the baseline estimates that range from 0.484 to 0.534 (see
Table 4), emphasizing the fact that the baseline estimates of trade elasticity are not driven by the
increased volatility in the BDI between 2008 to 2010.
The forth robustness check looks at the sensitivity of the baseline estimates to the inclusion
of additional explanatory variables that might be relevant for income. Income levels, thus living
standards, may be affected by institutional quality such as the extent of democratization of the
country’s political system (Acemoglu et al., 2008, 2009), as well as by inward FDI (Nair-Reichert
and Weinhold, 2001) and foreign aid (Werker et al., 2009). To control for institutional quality of
38We thank the anonymous referee for sharing this important insight.
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a country, we employ a proxy based on the revised Polity score (Polity2) obtained from the Polity
IV database of Marshall and Jaggers (2009). The revised Polity score is a combination of subscores
that measure the constraints on the chief executive, the competitiveness of political participation,
and the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment. This score ranges from -10 to
10, where a score of 10 indicates an institution that is most democratic possible. To control for
inward FDI flows and foreign aid to LDCs, we obtain these data from the UNTACD website and
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators respectively and apply the appropriate deflator
to obtain real values denoted in million U.S. dollars. The control variables of FDI and foreign aid
are expressed in logs.
Table 10 reports these robustness checks using both contemporaneous and lagged information
of BDI cost as instruments for trade. Therefore, these regressions are extensions of the baseline
regression reported in Column IV of Table 4. The main observation is that the baseline result is
robust. Across Columns I-III, a one standard deviation increase in BDI cost (in periods t, t − 1
and t−2) has a total effect of reducing trade from 15.4 percent (Column II) to 20 percent (Column
III). This range of estimates contains the baseline result of 16.6 percent reported in Column IV of
Table 4. Importantly, the baseline estimate of the effect of trade on income is also robust to the
inclusion of the additional controls. For instance, the estimated elasticity in Table 10 ranges from
0.465 (Column III) to 0.509 (Column II). These effects are much larger than the OLS estimates
but similar to the baseline estimate of 0.489.
6 Conclusion
The economic development of low income countries is an important priority facing both policy
makers and academic researchers. For these countries, one important question is whether the
opening of trade would help to improve their income levels and living standards. Even though
reservations have been expressed as early as Nurkse (1959),39 our main conclusion in this paper is
an emphatic yes.
In this paper, we construct a new measure of shipping cost based on the Baltic Dry Index as
an instrument for trade, which is then used to construct the within-country estimate of the effect
39See, also, Kaldor (1964) and Cohen (1965).
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that trade has on income of the LDCs. We find that the BDI generates a statistically significant
and quantitatively large response in the trade of the LDCs. Our 2SLS estimates suggest that a one
percent expansion in trade increases the GDP per capita of the LDCs by around 0.5 percent. This
estimated trade elasticity of income per capita is much larger than the OLS estimates, implying
that ignoring the endogeneity in trade would cause the estimates to be severely attenuated. Our
2SLS estimates are also twice as large as previous estimates in the literature that take into account
of both developed and developing countries (Feyrer, 2009a). From the development perspective,
our paper therefore affirms that trade is pivotal for improving the income and living standards
especially of the less developed nations.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
log(GDP per capita) 760 6.155 0.806 4.234 9.720
log(Trade) 760 6.993 1.603 1.358 11.345
Primary products share of total trade (θi,t) 760 0.355 0.142 0.022 0.846
log(BDI) 768 7.695 0.614 6.853 8.865
BDI Cost (BDICi,t) 712 2.728 1.094 0.155 5.895
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Table 2: OLS Regression of income on trade
I II III IV
Dependent Variable: log(GDP per Capita)
log(Trade) -0.094 0.112 0.309*** 0.331***
(0.075) (0.073) (0.059) (0.116)
Landlocked & island dummies no yes yes yes
Country fixed effects no no yes yes
Year fixed effects no no no yes
Countries 48 48 48 48
Observations 760 760 760 760
Adj. R2 0.034 0.281 0.965 0.966
Note: Cluster robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. Statistical significance
at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively.
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Table 3: Reduced form regression of income on BDI cost
I II III IV
Dependent Variable: log(GDP per Capita)
BDI Cost (BDICi,t) -0.078** -0.020
(0.041) (0.019)
BDI Cost, First Lag (BDICi,t−1) -0.068** -0.003
(0.035) (0.013)
BDI Cost, Second Lag (BDICi,t−2) -0.064** -0.053**
(0.033) (0.026)
Adj. R2 0.962 0.969 0.973 0.973
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Countries 48 48 48 48
Observations 712 664 616 616
Note: Cluster robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. Statistical significance
at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively.
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Table 4: 2SLS regression of income on trade
I II III IV
Dependent Variable (2nd Stage): log(GDP per Capita)
log(Trade) 0.534*** 0.530*** 0.484*** 0.489***
(0.186) (0.172) (0.150) (0.158)
Dependent Variable (1st Stage): log(Trade)
BDI Cost (BDICi,t) -0.147** -0.030
(0.061) (0.036)
BDI Cost, First Lag (BDICi,t−1) -0.128** -0.012
(0.054) (0.025)
BDI Cost, Second Lag (BDICi,t−2) -0.132*** -0.111***
(0.050) (0.039)
First-stage adj. R2 0.971 0.974 0.977 0.977
First-stage F-Stat 59 71 61 153
Second-stage adj. R2 0.969 0.974 0.978 0.978
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Countries 48 48 48 48
Observations 712 664 616 616
Note: To instrument for trade, Column I uses the contemporaneous BDI cost (BDICi,t) defined
in (1), Column II uses its first lag (BDICi,t−1), Column III uses its second lag (BDI
C
i,t−2), and
Column IV uses all three variables. Cluster robust standard errors are reported in the parenthesis.
Statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively.
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Table 5: 2SLS regression of income on trade for high income developing and small-open economies
I II III IV
Dependent Variable (2nd Stage): log(GDP per Capita)
log(Trade) 0.097 -0.070 -0.075 -0.112
(2.200) (0.368) (0.205) (0.136)
Dependent Variable (1st Stage): log(Trade)
BDI Cost (BDICi,t) -0.0069 -0.114
(0.084) (0.075)
BDI Cost, First Lag (BDICi,t−1) 0.057 0.065*
(0.073) (0.038)
BDI Cost, Second Lag (BDICi,t−2) 0.163*** 0.156***
(0.056) (0.043)
First-stage adj. R2 0.944 0.955 0.958 0.969
First-stage F-Stat 35 35 15 30
Second-stage adj. R2 0.984 0.982 0.981 0.980
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Countries 13 13 13 13
Observations 149 139 130 130
Note: To instrument for trade, Column I uses the contemporaneous BDI cost (BDICi,t)
defined in (1), Column II uses its first lag (BDICi,t−1), Column III uses its second lag
(BDICi,t−2), and Column IV uses all three variables. Cluster robust standard errors are
reported in the parenthesis. Statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels are
indicated by *, ** and *** respectively.
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Table 6: 2SLS regression of income on trade excluding landlocked LDCs
I II III IV
Dependent Variable (2nd Stage): log(GDP per Capita)
log(Trade) 0.680*** 0.718*** 0.654*** 0.664***
(0.200) (0.197) (0.167) (0.175)
Dependent Variable (1st Stage): log(Trade)
BDI Cost (BDICi,t) -0.172** -0.012
(0.089) (0.042)
BDI Cost, First Lag (BDICi,t−1) -0.154** -0.020
(0.079) (0.034)
BDI Cost, Second Lag (BDICi,t−2) -0.158** -0.141**
(0.076) (0.061)
First-stage adj. R2 0.975 0.978 0.981 0.981
First-stage F-Stat 30 36 39 182
Second-stage adj. R2 0.964 0.968 0.976 0.976
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Countries 32 32 32 32
Observations 472 440 408 408
Note: The regressions exclude the sample of landlocked LDCs. To instrument for trade, Column I
uses the contemporaneous BDI cost (BDICi,t) defined in (1), Column II uses its first lag (BDI
C
i,t−1),
Column III uses its second lag (BDICi,t−2), and Column IV uses all three variables. Cluster robust
standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. Statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent
levels are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively.
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Table 7: 2SLS regression using an alternative BDI cost variable (1st robustness check)
I II III IV
Dependent Variable (2nd Stage): log(GDP per Capita)
log(Trade) 0.495*** 0.538*** 0.537*** 0.530***
(0.170) (0.190) (0.177) (0.193)













First-stage adj. R2 0.967 0.971 0.974 0.974
First-stage F-Stat 204 88 71 74
Second-stage adj. R2 0.966 0.969 0.974 0.974
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Countries 48 48 48 48
Observations 760 712 664 664
Note: The regressions employ instruments that are based on an alternative BDI cost variable,
defined as BDI
C
i,t = θi,t log(BDIt), the interaction between country i’s contemporaneous primary
products share of total trade and the log of the BDI. To instrument for trade, Column I uses
the contemporaneous BDI cost (BDI
C
i,t) defined in (8), Column II uses its first lag (BDI
C
i,t−1),
Column III uses its second lag (BDI
C
i,t−2), and Column IV uses all three variables. Cluster robust
standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. Statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent
levels are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively.
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Table 8: 2SLS regression using other BDI cost variables (2nd robustness check)
I II III IV
k = 2 k = 3 k = 4 k = 5
Dependent Variable (2nd Stage): log(GDP per Capita)
log(Trade) 0.524*** 0.470*** 0.465*** 0.583***
(0.168) (0.144) (0.154) (0.209)
Dependent Variable (1st Stage): log(Trade)
BDI Cost (B˜DI
C,k
i,t ) -0.129** -0.134*** -0.130*** -0.096**
(0.054) (0.050) (0.042) (0.040)
First-stage adj. R2 0.974 0.977 0.981 0.984
First-stage F-Stat 74 84 75 80
Second-stage adj. R2 0.974 0.979 0.981 0.980
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Countries 48 48 48 48
Observations 664 616 568 520
Note: The regressions employ instruments that are based on other BDI cost variables,
defined as B˜DI
C,k
i,t = θi,t−k log(BDIt), the interaction between the kth lag of country i’s
primary products share of total trade and the log of BDI. To instrument for trade, Column
I uses B˜DI
C,2
i,t (k = 2), Column II uses B˜DI
C,3
i,t (k = 3), Column III uses B˜DI
C,4
i,t (k = 4),
and Column IV uses B˜DI
C,5
i,t (k = 5). Cluster robust standard errors are reported in the
parenthesis. Statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels are indicated by *, **
and *** respectively.
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Table 9: 2SLS regression excluding financial crisis years (3rd robustness check)
I II III IV
Dependent Variable (2nd Stage): log(GDP per Capita)
log(Trade) 0.496*** 0.541*** 0.494*** 0.490***
(0.158) (0.143) (0.124) (0.126)
Dependent Variable (1st Stage): log(Trade)
BDI Cost (BDICi,t) -0.171*** -0.061
(0.063) (0.038)
BDI Cost, First Lag (BDICi,t−1) -0.152*** -0.026
(0.057) (0.031)
BDI Cost, Second Lag (BDICi,t−2) -0.162*** -0.127***
(0.053) (0.040)
First-stage adj. R2 0.971 0.974 0.977 0.977
First-stage F-Stat 57 63 65 127
Second-stage adj. R2 0.972 0.976 0.981 0.981
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Countries 48 48 48 48
Observations 568 520 472 472
Note: Financial crisis years from 2008 to 2010 are excluded. To instrument for trade, Column I
uses the contemporaneous BDI cost (BDICi,t) defined in (1), Column II uses its first lag (BDI
C
i,t−1),
Column III uses its second lag (BDICi,t−2), and Column IV uses all three variables. Cluster robust
standard errors are reported in the parenthesis. Statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent
levels are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively.
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Table 10: 2SLS regression of income on trade controlling for democracy, FDI and foreign aid (4th
robustness check)
I II III
Additional Control Polity log(FDI) log(Foreign aid)
Dependent Variable (2nd Stage): log(GDP per Capita)
log(Trade) 0.471*** 0.509*** 0.465***
(0.139) (0.171) (0.143)
Dependent Variable (1st Stage): log(Trade)
BDI Cost (BDICi,t) -0.023 -0.012 -0.043
(0.043) (0.031) (0.034)
BDI Cost, First Lag (BDICi,t−1) -0.016 -0.028 -0.023
(0.026) (0.025) (0.028)
BDI Cost, Second Lag (BDICi,t−2) -0.136*** -0.101** -0.117***
(0.044) (0.040) (0.041)
First-stage adj. R2 0.966 0.977 0.977
First-stage F-Stat 111.12 137.75 124.56
Second-stage adj. R2 0.978 0.976 0.980
Country fixed effects yes yes yes
Year fixed effects yes yes yes
Countries 43 48 48
Observations 540 578 568
Note: Column I controls for democracy using the Polity2 score. Column II controls for the
log of inward real FDI flows denominated in million U.S. dollars. Column III controls for the
log of real foreign aid denominated in million U.S. dollars. The regressions instrument for
trade using both contemporaneous and lagged BDI cost variables. Cluster robust standard
errors are reported in the parenthesis. Statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent
levels are indicated by *, ** and *** respectively.
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Figure 1: The Baltic Dry Index, 1985–2010
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Figure 2: BDI growth and trade growth for a sample of LDCs
Note: This figure plots the growth in the BDI and the growth in trade for a sample of LDCs. The left vertical axis
measures the growth in the BDI and the right vertical axis measures the growth in trade. The growth variables
are constructed as the first difference of their respective values in logs.
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Figure 3: BDI growth and trade growth of China
Note: This figure plots the growth in the BDI and the growth in trade of China. The left vertical axis measures the
growth in the BDI and the right vertical axis measures the growth in trade. The growth variables are constructed
as the first difference of their respective values in logs.
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Figure 4: BDI growth and trade growth of Brazil, Russia, India and Australia
Note: This figure plots the growth in the BDI and the growth in trade of Brazil, Russia, India and Australia.
The left vertical axis measures the growth in the BDI and the right vertical axis measures the growth in trade.
The growth variables are constructed as the first difference of their respective values in logs.
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Figure 5: The absolute average BDI elasticity of income for each LDC
Note: This figure plots the absolute value of the (time) average BDI elasticity of income per capita for each LDC. This
elasticity is computed based on equation (5). It shows the average percentage decline in GDP per capita in each country
following a one percent increase in the BDI. The asterisk denotes landlocked countries.
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Figure 6: The absolute average BDI elasticity of trade for each LDC
Note: This figure plots the absolute value of the (time) average BDI elasticity of trade for each LDC. This elasticity
is computed based on equation (6). It shows the average percentage decline in trade in each country following a one
percent increase in the BDI. The asterisk denotes landlocked countries.
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Appendix
Table A: List of 48 least developed countries (LDCs)
Africa, 33 Countries
Angola crude oil, diamonds, refined
petroleum products, coffee, sisal,
fish and fish products, timber,
cotton
Madagascar coffee, vanilla, shellfish, sugar, cot-
ton cloth, chromite, petroleum
products
Benin cotton, cashews, shea butter, tex-
tiles, palm products, seafood
Malawi# tobacco, tea, sugar, cotton, coffee,
peanuts, wood products, apparel
Burkina Faso# cotton, livestock, gold Mali# cotton, gold, livestock




diamonds, timber, cotton, coffee,
tobacco
Mozambique aluminum, prawns, cashews, cot-
ton, sugar, citrus, timber
Chad# oil, cattle, cotton, gum arabic Niger# uranium ore, livestock, cowpeas,
onions
Comoros∗ vanilla, ylang-ylang (perfume
essence), cloves, copra
Rwanda# coffee, tea, hides, tin ore
Congo, Demo-
cratic Republic
diamonds, gold, copper, cobalt,
wood products, crude oil, coffee
Sao Tome and
Principe∗
cocoa, copra, coffee, palm oil
Djibouti reexports, hides and skins, coffee
(in transit)





petroleum products, timber Sierra Leone diamonds, rutile, cocoa, coffee, fish
Eritrea livestock, sorghum, textiles, food,
small manufactures
Somalia livestock, bananas, hides, fish, char-
coal, scrap metal
Ethiopia# coffee, qat, gold, leather products,
live animals, oilseeds
Sudan oil and petroleum products, cotton,
sesame, livestock, groundnuts, gum
arabic, sugar
Gambia peanut products, fish, cotton lint,
palm kernels
Tanzania gold, coffee, cashew nuts, manufac-
tures, cotton
Guinea bauxite, alumina, gold, diamonds,
coffee, fish, agricultural products
Togo reexports, cotton, phosphates, cof-
fee, cocoa
Guinea-Bissau fish, shrimp; cashew nuts, peanuts,
palm kernels, sawn lumber
Uganda# coffee, fish and fish products, tea,
cotton, flowers, horticultural prod-
ucts, gold
Lesotho# manufactures (clothing, footwear,
road vehicles), wool and mohair,
food and live animals
Zambia# copper, cobalt, electricity, tobacco,
flowers, cotton
Liberia rubber, timber, iron, diamonds, co-
coa, coffee
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Asia and Oceania, 14 Countries
Afghanistan# opium, fruits and nuts, handwo-
ven carpets, wool, cotton, hides and
pelts, precious and semi-precious
gems
Nepal# clothing, pulses, carpets, textiles,
juice, pashima, jute goods
Bangladesh garments, frozen fish and seafood,
jute and jute goods, leather
Samoa∗ fish, coconut oil and cream, copra,
taro, automotive parts, garments,
beer
Bhutan# electricity (to India), ferrosilicon,
cement, calcium carbide, copper
wire, manganese, vegetable oil
Solomon
Islands∗
timber, fish, copra, palm oil, cocoa
Burma natural gas, wood products, pulses,
beans, fish, rice, clothing, jade and
gems
Timor-Leste∗ coffee, sandalwood, marble
Cambodia clothing, timber, rubber, rice, fish,
tobacco, footwear
Tuvalu∗ copra, fish
Kiribati# copra, coconuts, seaweed, fish Vanuatu∗ copra, beef, cocoa, timber, kava,
coffee
Laos# wood products, coffee, electricity,
tin, copper, gold
Yemen crude oil, coffee, dried and salted
fish, liquefied natural gas
Americas and the Caribbean, 1 Country
Haiti∗ apparel, manufactures, oils, cocoa,
mangoes, coffee
Note: ∗ denotes an island state, # denotes a landlocked country. The list of LDCs is taken from the UN website
http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/25 and information about exports is obtained from the CIA World Factbook
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/.
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Table B: List of high income developing and small-open economies
1. Anguilla 2. Antigua and Barbuda
3. Cayman Islands 4. Cook Islands
5. Guam 6. Montserrat
7. Niue 8. Northern Mariana Islands
9. Palau 10. Saint Kitts and Nevis
11. Saint Lucia 12. Seychelles
13. Turks and Caicos Islands
Note: This is a sample of “high income” countries, classified by the World Bank as countries whose gross
national income per capita exceeds 12,276 U.S. Dollars in 2010.
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Highlights.txt
The Self-Organizing Map analysis is compared with the cluster analysis methods.
The EOF is used to reduce the data dimension and data noises.
The SOM is the most insensitive to the cut-off EOF mode number.
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